Israel is debating whether to join the latest US military campaign against Iran, now entering its 10th day, but Washington appears hesitant to involve its ally directly. The issue is not whether Israel wants to participate or has the military capability to do so. The main concern in Washington is that Israeli involvement could turn a limited operation into a wider regional war that does not serve President Donald Trump’s immediate objectives.

For now, Israeli intervention appears to be viewed in US calculations as a potential liability rather than an additional tool against Iran. This is why the White House is keeping Israel outside the current operation, which it does not want to transform into an open-ended regional conflict.

Trump’s goal appears to be bringing Iran back to negotiations and reviving a previous understanding based on Washington’s interpretation of its terms, rather than pursuing the ambitious objectives and rhetoric that marked the early stages of the conflict. The US president finds himself facing a dilemma similar to the one described by former President Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War. He referred to it as being a hitchhiker stuck in a Texas hailstorm: “You can't run from it, you can't get out of it.”

Washington is also seeking to preserve the political justification for its military actions. It has presented its strikes as a response to what it calls the “Iranian threat to freedom of navigation” in the Strait of Hormuz, rather than as part of a joint campaign with Israel. Separating the two objectives gives the US greater flexibility if a diplomatic settlement over Hormuz becomes possible, which appears to be a central goal of the current escalation.

Iran’s position is based on preventing conditions that could allow greater Israeli involvement, but from a position of deterrence rather than weakness. Iranian decision makers are aware that they have secured major strategic gains from the conflict, particularly by establishing effective control over the Strait of Hormuz.

Tehran therefore seeks to avoid Israel entering the confrontation, not because it considers Israel an overwhelming force, but because Israeli involvement would require Iran to divide its military focus across additional fronts. This would undermine Tehran’s current strategy of maintaining its position in Hormuz and responding to US strikes without being drawn into a wider regional war.

For Israel, regardless of whether it joins the fighting, the preferred outcome appears to be the continuation of US-Iran strikes and the collapse of any diplomatic track between Washington and Tehran. The failure of negotiations would reduce US pressure on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, which has become a key priority for Israeli leaders after what they view as limited prospects for success against Iran.

With the possibility of US-Iran talks fading, Israel would have more room to avoid commitments on the northern front and maintain its military presence in Lebanon, regardless of any framework agreement with Beirut or other diplomatic arrangements.

For now, Israel appears to be monitoring developments while hoping the confrontation continues. However, it has shown limited ability to pursue an independent strategic course outside the US umbrella.

Iran, meanwhile, is preparing for multiple scenarios, including the possibility of a limited ground operation beyond air strikes. The scenario has gained attention among Iranian circles and has also been discussed by US and Western media.

Iranian analysts believe that US strikes on infrastructure in southern Iran, including bridges, railway lines, and airports, are aimed at restricting Tehran’s ability to move forces and supplies toward Hormuz. They argue that such strikes could also prepare the ground for a possible attempt to seize parts of Iran’s southern coastline and establish direct control over the strait.

While such a scenario cannot be ruled out, major obstacles remain. These include the lack of clear operational foundations on the ground, the potentially severe consequences for the US, and doubts over whether a military operation could realistically reopen the Strait of Hormuz. For now, these factors limit the feasibility of such an option.

This is an edited translation for an article published in Arabic.